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CHAPTER 7 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON S.J.* 
§ 7.1. Contract Choice-of-Law Rule - Statute of Frauds - Law of 
Jurisdiction Which Validates Transaction Controls. Contract cases have 
been a particular problem in the conflict of laws because of the confusion 
which has characterized the conflicts law pertaining to the validity of 
contracts. Three choice of law rules have emerged in determining the 
validity of contracts in a multistate setting: (1) the law of the place of the 
making of the contract; (2) the law of the place of the performance of 
the contract; and (3) the law intended by the parties to control the 
contract. 1 Until recently, American courts have applied any one of these 
three rules without acknowledging their inconsistency. The original Res-
tatement of Conflict of Laws adopted the place-of-making rule, lex loci 
contractus. 2 Automatic application of the lex loci contractus rule gener-
ally was rejected by the American courts, however, because in a large 
number of cases the doctrine did not identify the state with the greatest 
interest in the contract. 
Although the indiscriminate use of the three traditional rules has con-
tinued,3 a new approach to the validity-of-contract problem has been 
receiving increasing approbation by the courts and publicists. The 
"grouping of contracts" theory emphasizes that the law of the place which 
has significant contacts with the parties and with the transaction should 
govern the validity of the contract. Obviously, the "grouping of contacts" 
theory gives less certainty and predictability than the original Restate-
ment's rigid place-of-making rule. Nevettheless, the rule permits a court 
to focus upon the law of the jurisdiction which has the paramount interest 
in the multistate transaction. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws has aligned itself with the "contacts" standard. In rejecting the 
dogma of the lex loci contractus, the Restatement (Second) states that 
*FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. specializes in the areas of Conflict of Laws and 
International Law in his teaching at Boston College Law School. 
§ 7.1 1 SeeR. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAW§§ 144-47 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter 
LEFLAR]; E. ScoLES & P. HAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18.13-18.15 (1982) [hereinafter 
SCOLES & HAY]. 
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 332 (1934). 
3 See LEFLAR, supra note I, at§ 145; ScoLES & HAY, supra note I, at§ 18,14. 
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the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the state with which 
the transaction has "its most significant relationship. "4 
Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated its will-
ingness to abandon the traditional place-of-making rule in favor of "a 
more functional approach" when determining what law to apply in con-
tract cases.5 During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
Bushkin Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,6 again considered the conflict 
of laws rule in a contract case. In answer to questions certified to it by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit/ the Court chose 
as its conflicts rule the law which validated the contract. 8 
The plaintiffs, Bushkin Associates, Inc. and Merle Bushkin ("Bush-
kin"), brought suit to recover on an oral fee agreement allegedly made 
between Bushkin and the defendant, Raytheon Company ("Raytheon"), 
for services in connection with Raytheon's acquisition of Beech Aircraft 
Corporation ("Beech").9 Bushkin also sought payment for the reasonable 
value of any information Bushkin gave Raytheon, and alleged that Ray-
theon had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices. 10 The 
factual background in Bushkin identified New York and Massachusetts 
as the states connected with the transaction. 11 Bushkin, a New York 
resident specializing in mergers and acquisitions, was president of Bush-
kin Associates, a corporation organized and based in New York. 12 Ray-
theon was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
Massachusetts. 13 
Bushkin's dealings with Raytheon concerning the acquisition of Beech 
began in 1971. 14 Negotiations were carried on via telephone conversations 
between Bushkin in New York and Raytheon in Massachusetts. 15 Bush-
kin alleged that the oral fee agreement was made in a telephone call 
which occurred in January, 1975. During this conversation Raytheon's 
representative acknowledged that Raytheon was interested in acquiring 
Beech, and that Raytheon would pay a fee of one percent of the value 
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 188 (1971). 
5 Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Servs., Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 541, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 
1048-49 (1979). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 7.6, at 
269-71. 
6 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985). 
7 /d. at 622-23, 473 N.E.2d at 664. 
8 /d. at 636, 473 N.E.2d at 671. 
9 /d. at 624, 473 N.E.2d at 664. 
10 Id. at 638-39, 473 N.E.2d at 672. See G.L. c. 93A. 
11 393 Mass. at 624, 473 N.E.2d at 664. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. 
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of the transaction to Bushkin if the acquisition of Beech took place. 16 
Raytheon's representative later told Bushkin that Raytheon had decided 
that it was no longer interested in Beech. 17 Subsequently, Raytheon 
contracted in writing with another company for consulting services con-
cerning mergers and acquisitions, and, in February, 1980, Raytheon ac-
quired Beech with the help of its new consulting company, paying the 
latter $1,100,000 for its services. 18 
Bushkin brought a diversity suit to recover on the oral fee agreement 
allegedly made with the defendant, Raytheon, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts. 19 Raytheon moved for sum-
mary judgment, contending that the New York statute of frauds should 
apply to this case and that, under New York law, the oral agreement 
would be unenforceable.20 Bushkin answered that the Massachusetts 
statute of frauds, which would not invalidate the oral agreement, should 
control.21 The district court ordered summary judgment for Raytheoo, 
holding that the New York statute of frauds governed the action and 
that, under New York law, the oral agreement was invalid. 22 
The district court, in compliance with the Erie-Klaxon doctrine appli-
cable in cases involving diversity jurisdiction, followed the conflicts law 
of Massachusetts23 and concluded that the Supreme Judicial Court would 
not apply the principle that choice of law would be governed by the place 
of contracting. 24 The court further concluded that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws "most significant relationship" test was not an 
effective means for resolving the conflicts problem in the case. 25 Instead, 
the court opted for "interest" analysis as the way to settle the conflict 
between New York and Massachusetts law. 26 Applying this analysis, the 
federal district court held that New York had a strong interest in pro-
tecting defendants against unfounded claims, even when New York bro-
kers and finders sued non-New Yorkers.27 Turning to Massachusetts law, 
the court found that Massachusetts had only a minimal interest in apply-
16 Id. at 624-25, 473 N.E.2d at 664-65. 
17 Id. at 625, 473 N.E.2d at 665. 
18 Id. at 626, 473 N.E.2d at 665. 
19 See 570 F. Supp. 596 (D. Mass. 1983); Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1983 ANN. SuRv. 
MASS. LAW§ 2.5, at 32-37. 
20 570 F. Supp. at 596. 
21 Id. 
22 ld. at 603. 
23 Id. at 598. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
24 570 F. Supp. at 599. 
" ld. at 600. 
26 ld. at 600-01. 
27 Id. at 601-02. 
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ing its law to this case.28 The court concluded that "interest analysis 
clearly tips the scale in favor of applying New York law to the facts of 
this case. "29 
Applying New York law, the federal district court found that the New 
York statute offrauds clearly invalidated the oral contract between Bush-
kin and Raytheon. 30 The court also held that the statute of frauds barred 
Bushkin' s implied contract claim for the reasonable value of the infor-
mation and services rendered to RaytheonY Finally, the court rejected 
Bushkin's allegation that Raytheon engaged in unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices, noting that this claim merely restated Bushkin's express 
and implied contract claims.32 The federal district court therefore allowed 
Raytheon's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Bushkin's com-
plaint.33 Bushkin then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit. 34 
Concluding that it was not "confident of the choice that would be made 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in this important case," the federal court 
of appeals certified to the Supreme Judicial Court the question whether 
the Massachusetts or New York statute of frauds should be applied in 
this action involving an alleged oral agreement between the plaintiff 
Bushkin and the defendant Raytheon. 35 An action based on such an oral 
agreement would be barred under the New York statute of frauds, but 
would not be barred under the Massachusetts statute of frauds. 36 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that the federal district court in 
Bushkin was correct in concluding that the Court would not allow the 
choice of law question to turn on where the contract was made. 37 The 
Court had rejected the simple lex loci contractus rule in its opinion in 
Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc. 38 Although unable to select 
among current theories as alternatives to the old lex loci contractus rule 
because of the fact pattern in Choate, the Court had cited with appro-
bation Currie's "interest" analysis and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws "most significant relationship" test. 39 The facts in Bushkin, 
28 Id. at 602. 
29 Id. 
3o Id. 
31 Id. at 603. 
32 Id. 
"!d. 
34 393 Mass. at 626, 473 N .E.2d at 666. 
35 Id. at 622-23, 473 N.E.2d at 664. 
36 !d. at 623, 473 N.E.2d at 664. 
37 Id. at 630, 473 N.E.2d at 668. 
38 378 Mass. 535, 392 N .E.2d 1045 (19'?9). 
39 Id. at 541, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
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cited its decision in Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 22 in which it 
recognized that established conflicts principles "are a useful starting point 
in determining whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts bears an 
'appropriate relation' to a given transaction or occurrence. "23 The Court 
ruled, therefore, that chapter 106, section 1-105(1) authorized the Court 
to apply Massachusetts common law conflicts principles to commercial 
transactions. 24 
The Supreme Judicial Court turned to its recent decision in Bushkin 
Associates, Inc. v. Raytheon Co. 25 as a source of relevant common law 
conflicts principles. In Bushkin, the Court adopted the general principles 
advanced in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to resolve 
conflicts problems involving contracts. 26 Section 191 of the Restatement 
provides that the law to be applied to a contract involving the sale of a 
chattel is "the local law of the state where under the terms of the contract 
the seller is to deliver the chattel unless, with respect to the particular 
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the 
principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties. "27 The Court 
endorsed this rule on the grounds that "[d]elivery is the most significant 
stage of the sales transaction," and that "[t]he rule also furthers the 
values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result."28 
The Court also noted that the rule of section 191 is consistent with 
traditional emphasis on the place of delivery in Massachusetts decisions 
of conflicts cases involving the sale of goods. 29 Section 191, comment d, 
of the Restatement (Second) provides that "[i]n an f.o.b. contract, the 
place of delivery ordinarily is that where under the terms of the contract 
the seller is to deliver the goods to the carrier f.o.b." The Supreme 
Judicial Court observed that this rule conforms with the principle in the 
Uniform Commercial Code that in the case of an f.o.b. point-of-shipment 
contract, delivery occurs at the point where the goods are placed in the 
hands of the carrier. 30 The Court noted that it was undisputed that the 
22 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1983 ANN. 
SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 2.1, at 15-20. 
23 389 Mass. at 331, 450 N .E.2d at 584. 
24 394 Mass. at 98, 474 N.E.2d at 1073. 
25 393 Mass. 622, 473 N.E.2d 662 (1985). The Bushkin decision is discussed in section 
one of this chapter. 
26 /d. at 632-34, 473 N.E.2d at 669-70. 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 191 comment e (1971). 
28 394 Mass. at 99, 474 N.E.2d at 1073 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)§ 191 comment 
e). 
29 /d. at 99, 474 N.E.2d at 1073. See Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 345 Mass. 
429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963). The Skinner decision is discussed in Nicholson, Conflict of 
Laws, 1963 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 8.2, at 89-92. 
3o 394 Mass. at 100, 474 N.E.2d at 1074. See G.L. c. 106 §§ 2-319(a), 2-504. 
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Travenol products were all sold "F.O.B. Cambridge, Massachusetts. "31 
The Court concluded, therefore, that the goods at issue were delivered 
in Massachusetts and that Massachusetts law should govern this contro-
versy between Travenol and ZotaP2 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Travenol strengthens the 
Restatement (Second) as the preferred approach to resolving conflicts 
problems in Massachusetts. The Court, by using the principles of the 
Restatement (Second) to interpret the "appropriate relation" test of sec-
tion 1-105 (1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, has given welcome 
specificity to the choice-of-law rule governing the sale of chattels. Trav-
enol also affirms the Court's policy of protecting the "justified expecta-
tions" of the parties to a contract, the critical criterion for conflicts 
contract cases set forth by section 6(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second). 33 
This policy, the Court noted, pointed to the application of Massachusetts 
law in this case, "since presumably both parties must have expected that 
goods purchased would be properly paid for. "34 It is submitted that the 
Massachusetts rule which validated the contract between Travenol and 
Zotal is the proper one. This law of validation, as the Court stated in 
Travenol, "furthers the values of certainty and predictability, and is thus 
consistent with the public interest, that a seller be entitled to the price 
of goods accepted. "35 
§ 7.3. Legitimation of Child Born Out of Wedlock - Law of Child's 
Domicile Controls. In recent years, the notion of the inferior status of the 
illegitimate child has largely disappeared and the attitudes of society 
toward such a child have become much more humane. Legal rules which, 
in the past, discriminated against illegitimate children increasingly have 
been declared unconstitutiona1. 1 In a 1977 decision, Trimble v. Gordon,2 
the United States Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute, which 
excluded an illegitimate child as a distributee of the father's estate, 
discriminated against the child in a manner prohibited by the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 3 the Court held that in making awards under a state 
workmen's compensation law for the death of the father, legitimate and 
31 394 Mass. at 100, 474 N.E.2d at 1074. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. See Bushkin, 393 Mass. at 635-36, 473 N.E.2d at 670-71. 
§ 7.3 1 SeeR. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAW§§ 241-42 (3d ed. 1977); W. REESE 
& M. ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 862-64 (8th ed. 1984); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 16.1-16.3 (1982). 
2 430 u.s. 762 (1977). 
3 406 u.s. 164 (1972). 
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the Court continued, presented the opportunity unavailable in Choate. 40 
The Court decided that it would not tie Massachusetts conflicts law to 
any specific choice of law doctrine, but sought instead a functional choice 
of law approach that responded to the interests of the parties and the 
states involved.41 
The Supreme Judicial Court found an obvious source of guidance in 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.42 Section 141 of the Res-
tatement resolves conflicts questions involving a statute of frauds ac-
cording to the choice of law principle applicable to all substantive con-
tract issues.43 Sections 187 and 188 of the Restatement provide that, in 
the absence of a choice of law by the parties, their rights "are determined 
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the 
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. "44 Section 
188 identifies the contacts determinative of the state of most significant 
relationship as: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation 
of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the 
subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. 45 
After analyzing the contacts Bushkin and Raytheon had with Massa-
chusetts and New York, the Court decided that neither state qualified as 
the one with the more significant relationship to the transaction or the 
parties.46 The Court then turned to the choice-influencing factors listed 
in section 6(2) of the Restatement (Second) and found the significant 
consideration in section 6(2)(d): the protection of justified expectationsY 
This consideration, the Court stated, favored the application of Massa-
chusetts law.48 The Court concluded that Bushkin and Raytheon expected 
that any oral agreement between them would be enforced. The Court 
noted that Raytheon had made other, similar agreements with Bushkin, 
and since Bushkin was not in the business of supplying free information, 
the Court observed, he certainly expected the fee agreement with Ray-
theon to be enforced.49 Where relevant contacts are balanced, the Court 
ruled, "we are inclined to resolve the choice by choosing that law 'which 
would carry out and validate the transaction in accordance with intention, 
40 393 Mass. at 631, 473 N.E.2d at 668. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. at 632, 473 N.E.2d at 669. 
43 /d. 
44 /d. 
45 /d. 
46 /d. at 633-34, 473 N .E.2d at 669-70. 
47 /d. at 634-35, 473 N.E.2d at 670. The Court noted that Leflar's five choice-influencing 
considerations parallel the factors contained in § 6(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). /d. 
4s /d. at 635, 473 N.E.2d at 670-71. 
49 /d. at 635, 473 N .E.2d at 671. 
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in preference to a law that would tend to defeat it. "'50 In this case, the 
Court stated, the law that would validate the agreement was that of 
Massachusetts.51 Consequently, in answer to the principal question cer-
tified by the federal court of appeals, the Supreme Judicial Court con-
cluded that the law of Massachusetts should determine the issue of the 
validity of the oral agreement between Bushkin and Raytheon. 52 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Bushkin is important in that 
for the first time the Court has chosen among extant conflicts doctrines 
regarding choice-of-law questions in a contract case. 53 Bushkin makes it 
clear that the Court has rejected the vested rights lex loci contractus 
doctrine, reaffirming its holding in Choate. 54 Moreover, the Court clearly 
endorses the Restatement (Second) contacts or functional approach to 
contract conflicts issues55 in which it had indicated an interest in an earlier 
conflicts contract case.56 The Restatement (Second) approach, already 
adopted in a large number of states, determines the state of most signif-
icant relationship by qualitative analysis, and not merely by "adding up 
various contacts. "57 Section 6(2)( d) of Restatement (Second) identifies 
the protection of justified expectations as the significant contact in choos-
ing the proper law to resolve a conflicts contract case. This paramount 
consideration of the justified expectations of the parties led the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Bushkin to apply the law of Massachusetts to validate 
the contract between Bushkin and Raytheon in accordance with the 
intention of the parties. The law of validation (lex validitatis) is emerging 
as the preferred choice-of-law rule in contract cases.58 The Court's de-
cision in Bushkin recognizes this development in conflicts contract law 
and properly endorses it. 
§ 7 .2. Contract of Sale: Uniform Commercial Code and Choice-of-Law 
Rule. During the Survey year, in Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Zotal, 
50 ld. at 636, 473 N.E.2d at 671 (quoting Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Paris, 15 
Mass. App. Ct. 686, 691, 447 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (1983)). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 
1983 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 2.2, at 20. 
51 393 Mass. at 636, 473 N.E.2d at 671. 
52 /d. In answer to a second question certified by the federal court of appeals, the Court 
stated that Raytheon was entitled to the exemption ofG.L. c. 93A, § 3(1)(b)(i) because the 
alleged deceptive acts and practices forming the basis of Bushkin's chapter 93A claim did 
not occur primarily in Massachusetts. /d. at 637-39, 473 N.E.2d at 671-72. 
53 /d. at 631, 473 N.E.2d at 668. 
54 /d. at 630-31, 473 N.E.2d at 668. 
55 /d. at 631-32, 473 N.E.2d at 668-69. 
56 Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 385 Mass. 672, 433 N.E.2d 886 (1982). See Nicholson, Conflict 
of Laws, 1982 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 7.8, at 274-77. 
57 393 Mass. at 632-33, 473 N.E.2d at 669. 
58 See LEFLAR, supra note I, at§§ 103, 148. 
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Ltd., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts once again indicated 
its preference for the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ap-
proach.1 In Travenol, the Court used the apposite sections of the Res-
tatement (Second) to interpret the "appropriated relation" criterion of 
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 106, section 1-105(1), the choice-
of-law provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 
In 1974, the defendant Zotal, Ltd. ("Zotal") was appointed the exclu-
sive distributor in Israel of certain medical products of a company which 
was later acquired by and became a division of the plaintiff Travenol 
Laboratories, Inc. ("Travenol").3 In November, 1979, Travenol informed 
Zotal that it was terminating the distributorship arrangement, and that it 
was appointing an affiliate, Travenol Laboratories (Israel) Ltd. ("Trav-
enol Israel"), as its new Israeli distributor.4 In February, 1980, Travenol 
Israel, acting on behalf of Travenol, demanded that Zotal pay $42,449, 
the balance due on its account.5 Zotal answered by sending a letter, 
subsequently characterized as a notice of set-off, in which it stated that 
it had incurred $63,100 in damages because of the termination of its 
distributorship, and that it had the right to set off these damages against 
the amount owing for goods sold and delivered.6 In August, 1980, Zotal 
brought suit in Tel Aviv against Travenol Israel for damages for termi-
nation of its distributorship.7 
In the case at issue, Travenol brought suit to recover $40,873.15 for 
goods sold and delivered to Zotal. 8 Travenol moved for summary judg-
ment, and Zotal moved to stay all proceedings pending entry of judgment 
in the suit which it had brought in Israel.9 A judge of the Middlesex 
superior court denied the motion for a stay and granted Travenol's motion 
for summary judgment. 10 Zotal appealed and the case was transferred to 
§ 7.2 1 394 Mass. 95, 474 N.E.2d 1070 (1985). 
2 G.L. c. 106, § 1-105(1) provides: 
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable 
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that 
the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights 
and duties. Failing such agreement this chapter applies to transactions bearing an 
appropriate relation to this state. 
3 394 Mass. at 96, 474 N.E.2d at 1071. 
4Jd. 
s Id. Later, a credit given to Zotal reduced the amount owed to $40,873.15. Id. at 96 n.3, 
474 N.E.2d at 1072 n.3. 
6 /d. at 96, 474 N.E.2d at 1072. 
7 Id. Travenol was added as a defendant in April, 1981. ld. at 96 n.2, 474 N.E.2d at 1072 
n.2. 
8 /d. at 95, 474 N.E.2d at 1071. 
9Jd. 
10 Id. at 95-96, 474 N.E.2d at 1071. 
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the Supreme Judicial Court. 11 Applying Massachusetts law rather than 
Israeli law, the Court concluded that the superior court had been correct 
in denying Zotal's motion for a stay and in granting Travenol's motion 
for summary judgment. 12 
Turning to the issue of the grant of the plaintiff Travenol's motion for 
summary judgment, 13 the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the crucial 
question was whether Massachusetts or Israeli law governed the defen-
dant Zotal's notice of set-off. The Court noted that if Massachusetts law 
applied to this controversy, it was not disputed that Zotal's notice of set-
off would not constitute payment for goods sold and delivered, and thus 
Travenol would be entitled to summary judgment. 14 The Massachusetts 
Uniform Commercial Code permits the buyer to deduct damages resulting 
from a breach of contract only if the damages stem from a breach of the 
same contract under which the seller is attempting to recover his price. 15 
Moreover, under Massachusetts law it is well established that the buyer's 
obligation to pay for goods accepted does not arise under the "same 
contract" as the alleged breach of an exclusive distributorship agreement 
by the seller. 16 Zotal, however, contending that Israeli law applied to the 
controversy, 17 argued that Israeli law would allow the buyer to set off 
damages arising from the breach of a distributorship arrangement against 
the price owing for goods sold and delivered. 18 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the relevant conflict of 
laws rules required the application of Massachusetts law. 19 The Court 
noted that under chapter 106, section 1-105(1), the choice-of-law provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 20 Massachusetts law applies to 
"transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. "21 The Court 
11 Id. at 96, 474 N.E.2d at 1071. 
12 /d. at 96, 474 N.E.2d at 1072. Because Zotal did not brief the issue of the denial of its 
motion for a stay of the proceedings in Massachusetts, the Court concluded that it was not 
required to address the issue. /d. at 97, 474 N.E.2d at 1072. The Court noted, however, 
that a motion to stay proceedings ordinarily was a matter addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge. Id. Since Zotal already had admitted liability for the goods sold and 
delivered by Travenol, the Court ruled that there was no abuse of discretion by the superior 
court. /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
15 G.L. c. 106, § 2-717; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medical Elecs. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 
(D. Mass. 1982). 
16 529 F. Supp. at 1387. 
17 394 Mass. at 98, 474 N.E.2d at 1073. 
18 /d. 
19 /d. 
20 G.L. c. 106, § 1-105(1). 
21 394 Mass. at 98, 474 N.E.2d at 1073. 
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illegitimate children must be treated equally. Two 1968 decisions ruled 
that when considering the right of a mother to recover in a wrongful 
death action for the death of her child,4 and the right of a child to recover 
for the death of his or her mother, 5 distinctions based on the difference 
between illegitimate and legitimate children will fall under an equal pro-
tection attack. These United States Supreme Court decisions have been 
instrumental in removing the traditional prejudice, both social and legal, 
against those born out of wedlock. 
Conflict of laws rules pertaining to legitimation reflect the attitude 
favoring equality of treatment for illegitimate children. During the Survey 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Powers v. Steele,6 considered the 
question whether a child born out of wedlock was "issue" of the donor 
of a trust. In holding that the child was "issue" for purposes of the trust, 7 
the Court evidenced the humane and progressive policy of Massachusetts 
toward illegitimate children. 
Powers was submitted to the Supreme Judicial Court on an agreed-
upon statement of facts. 8 In April, 1957, the donor established an inter 
vivos trust providing for payment of income to the donor for life, then 
to his wife for life, and then to his two sons for their lives.9 The trust 
was to terminate upon the death of the survivor of the donor, his wife 
and his children. 10 On termination, the trustees were to divide the trust 
"as it shall then exist into equal shares, ... one share for each deceased 
child of the Donor having then living issue, and the Trustees shall trans-
fer, pay over and convey one such share by right of representation to 
the then living issue of each deceased child. " 11 The indenture of trust 
further authorized the trustees "to pay to or for the benefit of the issue 
of the Donor such amounts of principal as the Trustees may deem nec-
essary for comfort, maintenance, support and education."12 The trust 
was "governed by and [was] to be construed and administered according 
to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."13 
4 Glona v. American Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
5 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
6 394 Mass. 306, 475 N.E.2d 395 (1985). 
7 /d. at 310, 475 N.E.2d at 398. 
8 /d. at 307, 475 N.E.2d at 395. 
9 /d. at 307, 475 N.E.2d at 395-96. 
1o /d. at 307, 475 N.E.2d at 396. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. The trust instrument also provided that if there were no issue of the donor living 
at the termination of the trust, the trustees were to convey the trust estate "to those persons 
who would be the heirs at law of the Donor determined as though he had deceased intestate 
and unmarried immediately after the termination of the trust, a resident of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, said persons to take the same in the proportions to which they 
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The donor died on June 1, 1961, survived by his wife, since deceased, 
two sons, and no other issue. 14 A daughter was born out of wedlock to 
one of the sons on February 26, 1977, in New Hampshire ,IS The donor's 
son had the child's birth certificate amended to include his name as the 
child's father. 16 On January 30, 1984, a judge of the superior court in 
New Hampshire declared the child "legitimate" under the applicable New 
Hampshire statute. 17 
The plaintiff Powers, a trustee, brought suit in the Probate Court for 
Suffolk County on February 14, 1984,18 seeking a declaration that the 
legitimated child was the "issue" of the donor and his son for purposes 
of the trust and, therefore, was entitled to succeed to the son's interest 
in the trust. 19 A guardian ad litem appointed for the minor issue of the 
donor's nieces and nephew, the defendant, opposed the relief sought by 
the trustee, Powers. 20 The probate judge granted the parties' joint motion 
to report the complaint without decision to the Appeals Court for deter-
mination.21 The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the parties joint appli-
cation for direct appellate review. 22 
The Supreme Judicial Court first considered the appropriateness of the 
declaratory relief requested by the plaintiff, Powers, under chapter 
231A.23 Powers asserted that such relief was necessary in order to deter-
mine the legitimated child's status as a prospective beneficiary of the 
trust and the estate planning problems of her father, which depended 
upon her beneficiary status.24 The Court held that declaratory relief was 
appropriate, quoting its authoritative decision in Billings v. Fowler. 25 The 
Court stated: "[E]state planning interest is sufficient to permit declaratory 
relief, particularly in view of c. 231A, § 9, requiring that the chapter be 
'liberally construed,' so as 'to remove, and to afford relief from, uncer-
tainty ... with respect to rights. "'26 
would be entitled under the laws of said Commonwealth now in force." /d. at 307 n.2, 475 
N.E.2d at 396 n.2. 
14 !d. at 307, 475 N.E.2d at 396. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. 
17 !d. 
18 /d. at 308, 475 N.E.2d at 396. 
19 !d. at 306-07, 475 N.E.2d at 395. 
20 /d. at 308 n.4, 475 N.E.2d at 396 n.4. The donor's nieces and nephew are "the 
presumptive remaindermen of the trust upon the decease of the Donor's last surviving 
son," if the legitimated child is determined not to be the issue of the donor. /d. 
21 /d. at 308, 475 N.E.2d at 396. 
22 !d. 
23 !d. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. at 308, 475 N.E.2d at 396-97. 
26 !d. (quoting Billings v. Fowler, 361 Mass. 230, 234, 279 N.E.2d 906, 909 (1972)). 
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The Court then proceeded to determine the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim,27 The plaintiff's principal argument was that because the child 
was deemed legitimate under the law of her domicile, she must be con-
sidered the donor's legitimate issue for purposes of the trust under the 
law of Massachusetts. 28 The plaintiff acknowledged the traditional pre-
sumption that the term "issue" as used in a will or trust includes only 
legitimate children, 29 but pointed out that Massachusetts had long fol-
lowed the rule that the status of a person as to legitimacy was defined 
by the law of his or her domicile, and that Massachusetts would recognize 
such status unless it was contrary to public policy.30 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the child was born in New 
Hampshire and was domiciled there with her mother and father. 31 Her 
father had complied with the procedure established by New Hampshire 
law to legitimate a child. 32 The Court concluded, therefore, that the child 
was legitimate under Massachusetts law.33 
The defendant argued that the indenture of trust stated that the con-
struction of the trust was to be determined by the laws of Massachu-
setts. 34 The defendant contended that the child could not be deemed 
legitimate because her parents had not married as required under Mas-
sachusetts law. 35 The Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant's 
interpretation of Massachusetts law as to legitimacy, however, was er-
roneous.36 The Court stated that the Massachusetts conflict of laws rule 
determined the status of legitimacy of a person by the law of his domicile, 
the lex domiciliiY The Court affirmed its adherence to the lex domicilii 
rule. 38 
Finally, the defendant argued that deference to New Hampshire law in 
the circumstances found in Powers contravened Massachusetts policy. 39 
The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed. 40 The Court characterized Mas-
27 Id. at 308, 475 N.E.2d at 397. 
28 Id. at 308-09, 475 N.E.2d at 397. 
29 Id. at 309, 475 N.E.2d at 397. See Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Misho, 321 Mass. 615, 634-
37, 75 N.E.2d 3, 15 (1947). 
30 394 Mass. at 309, 475 N.E.2d at 397. See Fuss v. Fuss (No. 1), 372 Mass. 64, 67, 368 
N.E.2d at 271, 273 (1977). 
31 394 Mass. at 309, 475 N.E.2d at 397. 
32 Id. 
33 ld. 
34 Id. at 309-10, 475 N.E.2d at 397. 
35 Id. at 310, 475 N.E.2d at 397. See G.L. c. 190, § 7. 
36 394 Mass. at 310, 475 N.E.2d at 397. 
37 Id. See Green v. Kelly, 228 Mass. 602,606-07, 118 N.E. 235,237 (1917); Ross v. Ross, 
129 Mass. 243, 247 (1880). 
38 394 Mass. at 310, 475 Mass. at 397. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
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sachusetts policy as "progressive" in its concern for removing "the ob-
stacles to the legitimation of innocent children, who have no responsi-
bility for the circumstances of their birth, and thus ameliorating some of 
the apparent harshness of the common law . . . . "41 Consequently, the 
Court concluded that the child was the legitimate issue of the donor's 
son42 and remanded the case to the probate court for entry of judgment 
declaring that the child was the issue of the donor and his son as that 
term was used in the trust. 43 
Conflict of laws doctrine with respect to legitimacy is concerned with 
two issues: (1) the law governing legitimacy, and (2) the incidents of 
legitimacy created by foreign law.44 The first issue deals with the status 
of a child. The second issue focuses on the effects recognized in one 
state after a legitimation subsequent to the birth of a child under the laws 
of another state.45 Questions involving legitimacy as a status-that is as a 
relationship entirely apart from its incidents-do not arise frequently in 
conflicts cases.46 Most legitimacy conflicts cases are concerned with the 
incidents or effects of legitimacy. 47 In practice, however, courts will not 
decide matters involving the incidents of legitimacy until they have de-
termined whether or not legitimacy did exist.48 The Supreme Judicial 
Court followed this practice in Powers. 
The concept oflegitimacy involves family relations and responsibilities. 
Thus, the domicile of the child and his or her parents has the most 
significant interest in the solution of these problems. Where the parent 
and the child have been domiciled in a state from the time of the child's 
birth, as in Powers, legitimation of the child following the law of that 
state will be recognized everywhere.49 Therefore, the Supreme Judicial 
Court was correct in Powers when it held that the child was legitimate 
as determined by the law of New Hampshire, her domicile. 
Among the incidents that may depend upon a person's legitimacy are 
the right to his or her father's name and support and the right to share 
in the latter's estate. 5° As Powers reveals, whether a person is legitimate 
may also have a decisive bearing upon the questions of construction, 
such as whether he or she is included within such terms as "children" or 
41 ld. at 310, 475 N.E.2d at 397-98; See Green, 228 Mass. at 605, 118 N.E. at 237. 
42 394 Mass. at 310, 475 N.E.2d at 398. 
43 Id. 
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 287-88 (1971). 
4
' See W. REESE & M. RosENBERG, supra note 1, at 863. 
46 Id. 
47 ld. 
48 Id. 
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 44, at § 287 & comment f. 
'
0 Id. at § 288 comment a. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1985 [1985], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1985/iss1/11
§ 7.3 CONFLICT OF LAW 249 
"issue" contained in a will or trust. 51 It is established conflicts doctrine 
that a state will give the same incidents or effects to the status of legiti-
macy created by a foreign law that it gives to the status created under 
its own law.52 Thus the Supreme Judicial Court, in Powers, ruled that 
the child, as legitimate "issue", was entitled to succeed to her father's 
interest in the trust. The Court's decision reflects the progressive and 
humane conflict of laws rules now being applied in cases concerned with 
the legitimation of children born out of wedlock. 
51 /d. 
52 /d. at § 288 and comment b. 
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